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INTRODUCTION
Through much of the twentieth century, Argentina stood out among Latin 
American nations due to the signifi cant infl uence of its middle class. Various elements 
shaped this class, which not only occupied public service positions, as was the case 
in most of Latin America (Touraine 1988), but was also involved in a wide range of 
occupations. Its genesis occurred during the 1930s, when differential rent deriving 
from the agricultural sector resulted in distribution toward the administrative, 
service, and public administration sectors. During both the fi rst and the second 
administrations of Juan D. Perón (1946–55), social benefi ts favored the middle 
segments of society and also led to the formation of a protected working class that, 
to a large extent, considered itself part of the middle class. Economic modernization 
generated new qualifi ed jobs and led to remarkable intergenerational social mobility. 
These new jobs could not be taken by the elites, thus allowing middle classes to gain 
access to strategic positions. This was another distinctive feature of Argentina.
Sociology has often struggled to defi ne the “middle class.” Combining a quantitative 
and a qualitative approach, we defi ne the middle class as comprising people performing 
a wide range of non-manual occupations, such as clerks, professionals, and small-
business owners. Argentine studies of this trend in the 1980s that adopted this 
defi nition located 47.4% of the economically active population in this segment (Torrado 
1994). Thus, a rather heterogeneous middle class had emerged by that time, including 
public workers, administrative staff, professionals, small entrepreneurs, and business-
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to note that self-perception of class membership widely exceeds this structural 
defi nition: indeed, research from the same period reveals that almost 70% of the 
population (IPSA 1984) included itself in this group. In 2005, the share was 55% (Grupo 
CCR 2005). These fi gures are crucial to the defi nition of a national social identity.
The middle classes are structurally heterogeneous in their lifestyles, but they do 
share certain defi ning characteristics: increased access to education, built-in 
expectations of intergenerational social mobility, a trend to acquire homes in urban 
and suburban areas, an expenditure structure that prioritizes consumption over 
savings and a tendency to social modernization in terms of habits and practices. 
Their socio-political and socio-cultural attitudes are quite diverse, but while they 
may be left or right of center, they are generally opposed to Peronism—the great 
national-populist movement that has dominated Argentine political life since the 
1940s.
In a country that stands out because of its continuous state of economic and 
political crisis during the past century, the middle classes experienced frequent 
lifestyle fright like no other social category. Above all, they were affected by 
infl ationary processes since 1950. Nonetheless, nothing could be compared to what 
took place from 1976 on, during the last military government. At that time, 
a considerable portion of the middle classes experienced a downward mobility 
process that became known as “new poverty.”1 The process of pauperization that 
affected part of Argentine society was huge in scale: between 1980 and 1990, workers 
lost 38.8% of their income value, and the fi gure was even greater for middle-class 
occupations. Furthermore, salary disparities within these occupational categories 
increased.2 The depth and persistency of the crisis that began in the mid-1970s 
resulted in hundreds of thousands of middle-class families falling below the offi cially 
defi ned poverty line. In Greater Buenos Aires, inhabited today by some 13 million 
people, new poverty grew by 465% between 1980 and 1990 (Kessler 1998:96). Among 
the poor, one group stood out: pauperized former members of the middle classes, who 
became the new poor. They were joined by those who were not below the poverty line, 
but experience a signifi cant drop in income, forcing them to completely change their 
lifestyle.
Beyond the individuals who were affected by it, the pauperization of the middle 
sector marked a point of no return: the end of a certain kind of society. Until then, 
Argentina had been a relatively integrated society—at least by comparison with most 
1 Structural or traditional poverty refers to the criterion of unsatisfi ed basic needs (UBN), 
which considers in its measurement a set of variables essentially linked to lack of housing, 
waterworks, plumbing, and sanitation. In turn, poverty due to low income refers to poverty 
situations associated with insuffi cient income to pay the cost of the basic foods basket, 
goods, and services. The impoverished belong, then, to the group that falls under the poverty 
line; yet they do not lack conditions related to the UBN indicator (Minujin 1992:24).
2 For instance, skilled self-employed workers lost 52%, industry workers 38%, and service work-
ers 41%, whereas those less skilled and closer to the bottom of the wage scale lost less: the 
fi gure for both domestic service workers and small employers is 18%, yet heterogeneity  within 
those groups was vast.
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Latin American countries—where a large middle class had emerged as a result of 
a continuous process of upward social mobility.3 Scholarship was taken by surprise by 
this new phenomenon. A debate began on heterogeneous forms of poverty, and 
sociologists distinguished between the new poor and the traditional poor, who are 
characterized by a series of long-standing defi ciencies: low income, low educational 
attainment, precarious jobs, poor housing, and large families (Minujin 1992).
Impoverishment affected a heterogeneous category, the middle classes. In fact, 
as a social category, the new poor are characterized by being part of a hybrid stratum, 
in a twofold sense. On the one hand, they are closer to the middle sectors and share 
common economic and cultural variables with a long-term effect, such as education 
level and family structure—fewer members than those of structurally poor families—
yet they resemble the structural poor in that their incomes are low, they suffer from 
underemployment, and they lack social security coverage. These are all short-term 
variables resulting from the crisis. On the other hand, their origins are hybrid. As we 
mentioned, the statistics show marked income reductions in all occupational categories 
during the 1980s. By the same token, they illustrate that in each category, the gap 
between those earning the highest wages and those at the bottom of the scale was 
increasing. Hence, the new poor became a heterogeneous group made up of the “losers” 
in each occupational category. Quantitative heterogeneity had a qualitative 
counterpart: the diverse socio-professional profi les of the new poor were accompanied 
by diverse social backgrounds in terms of socialization, family origin, education, and 
professional history. Before fi nding themselves in poverty, each member of the group 
had evolved different expectations, beliefs, consumption patterns, and potential 
resources. Following pauperization, such background diversity would lead to hetero-
geneous ways of experiencing poverty.
From that moment on, the phenomenon of new poverty became part of Argentinean 
society. This fi rst wave of impoverishment was peculiar because it was not accompanied 
by job losses. As will be explained, in the decades that followed, the causes of 
impoverishment varied: in the 1990s, new poverty was due to the high unemployment 
rates reported from the very beginning of the decade. This phenomenon became 
steeper due to the convertibility crisis at the turn of the century (2001–02), when 
income-related poverty affected more than 40% of households in Greater Buenos Aires. 
A marked recession and high unemployment rates caused violent impoverishment.4 
Therefore, in dissimilar contexts and with different degrees of intensity, continuous 
impoverishment processes affected distinct groups of the population: whereas in the 
3 The idea of social mobility was refl ected by actual events. Gino Germani’s classic study of 
intergenerational mobility (1963), using data from the 1960s, shows that 36.5% of Greater 
Buenos Aires survey respondents whose parents were blue-collar workers managed to obtain 
middle- and upper-class jobs within the span of one generation. 77% of those whose parents 
belonged to the lowest occupational category—unskilled workers—achieved either skilled 
worker status or middle-class jobs within the same period.
4 In this populous district, income poverty in October 2001 reached 25.5% of households. By 
May 2002—after the depreciation—that percentage rose to 37.7%. This situation got worse 
throughout 2002 and by the end of the year it reached 42.3% of households (INDEC 2008).
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1980s, wage-dependent workers were the most affected, in the 1990s it was the turn of 
the unemployed: those entering the labor market for the fi rst time, the poorly-skilled, 
and/or adult household supporters close to retirement age. They all witnessed changes 
in their daily life and began to move in unstable social trajectories. In many cases 
the fall was fi nal. Others achieved some improvements before becoming victims of the 
following crisis.
With regard to social policies, impoverishment meant new challenges, since they 
were dealing with a population in need whose geographic location and cultural patterns 
differed from those of the traditional poor. As of today, there are still no specifi c 
programs targeting this population. 
This article focuses on the experience of pauperization, the peculiar feature of 
new poverty: a signifi cant and stable family income loss which can bring about—
or not—an occupational downward mobility. In other words, a loss of status but not 
necessarily a change in roles. It is a radical shift in lifestyle which affects every 
dimension of daily life, social relations and identity. This article briefl y reviews new 
poverty in Latin America in order to focus on different aspects of the Argentinean case 
based on our research of several years and that conducted by colleagues.5 Our works on 
the experience of pauperization (Cortés and Kessler 2003; Kessler 1998; 2000; 2008; 
Kessler and Di Virgilio 2005; Minujin and Kessler 1995) and those of other authors 
(Minujin 1992; Feijoó 1992; 2001) showed the magnitude of this process, which 
characterized the new poverty in Argentina from its origins. Despite its limitations, 
the case of Argentina may be instructive when analyzing other societies in the region 
and on other continents. After all, income concentration in Latin America during the 
1990s was, to a large extent, achieved at the expense of middle-income strata (Hoffman 
and Centeno 2003). After a recovery in the past few years resulting from signifi cant 
growth rates in Latin American countries, the consequences of the global fi nancial 
crisis create new challenges for the region’s middle sectors. Yet primarily, this article 
and the comparison with Svetlana Yaroshenko’s companion piece on Russia enable us 
to shed light on an issue raised years ago that remains unanswered: the similarities 
between the great impoverishment in Argentina and the one that took place in the 
former Soviet Union following the shift of political and economic regime there.
5 In those studies, formal education achieved by adult members of the household—essentially, 
household head and spouse—was considered as a social class indicator. This indicator is 
usually associated with typical occupations performed by each class. When dealing with the 
impoverished middle sectors, we selected households whose adult members had completed 
secondary education and/or had access to complete or incomplete post-secondary education, 
and were engaged in non-manual labor. In relation to housing, these families owned houses 
in the city proper and not in the shantytowns, gaining access to them (at least in the 
beginning) through formal housing market mechanisms. Education, occupation, and housing 
are related to lifestyles which defi ne social interaction opportunities and access to a variety 
of social resources (Sautu 2001). Quantitative and qualitative data included throughout this 
paper allows us to grasp the relevance of the new poverty phenomenon and to understand 
it by gaining access to the actors’ experience.
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NEW POVERTY IN LATIN AMERICA6
The notion of “new poverty” is not as central in Latin America as it might be in 
other regions. That is probably due to the fact that structural poverty has remained 
persistent and the middle classes have not historically been considered important. 
We have been unable to fi nd references to new poverty in the numerous studies of 
poverty undertaken by international organizations. However, the position of 
vulnerable local middle classes has gradually entered the local debate. In fact, middle 
classes were affected differently in each country by the debt crisis of the 1980s and, 
following the implementation of structural adjustment programs, by income 
concentration processes, a rise in the cost of private services, and a reduction in the 
quality of public services, as well as labor market shifts in the 1990s. Some studies of 
this topic began to be undertaken on the heels of these processes. One of the foremost 
among them is the one conducted by Lomnitz and Melnick (1991) in Chile, who were 
interested in the situation of teachers under Pinochet’s regime in the 1980s. Reforms 
in the national education system and the ban on trade union activities caused the 
teachers—who were a paradigm case of a middle class occupying public positions—
to lose economic and social power. Following further growth and the appearance of 
the idea of a more heterogeneous, “emerging middle class,” worries about pauper-
ization were renewed as the limits to Chile’s development model became apparent. 
As early as 2000, it was possible to observe that sectors with fewer resources were the 
most affected by job loss and income depreciation. The increase experienced in overt 
unemployment in Chile and the Santiago metropolitan area from 1998, “face as 
a counterpart the reproduction of higher inequality levels” (Sabatini and Wormald 
2005:33). Impoverishment of lower-middle sectors and an ascending, emerging 
middle class are two sides of the peculiar confi guration of inequality presented by 
Torche (2005) in Chile. Her study showed that vast sectors of the population are 
threatened by the ghost of impoverishment. This is mainly due to the peculiar traits 
of Chile’s social structure, which features signifi cant occupational mobility, high 
income concentration in the top deciles and little differentiation between lower and 
lower-middle sectors, which makes them structurally vulnerable. Likewise, in a context 
in which the labor market gives priority to highly skilled workers, a new, “hard” 
poverty phenomenon emerges. This is made up of people and households lacking the 
basic resources and opportunities needed to overcome their condition by their own 
means.
The evolution of poverty in Mexico also shows some distinctiveness of its own. 
During the 1990s, unemployment rates were low, though Mexico did not escape 
a marked reduction in wages or growth of the informal sector (Bayón 2006). The 
counterpart to reduced open unemployment rates is high occupation within the 
6 The processes described did not always take place at the same time in each Latin American 
country, , although they all occurred by the end of the twentieth century. In each and every 
case, they are phenomena that show similar traits and have affected similar social categories. 
Thus the validity of juxtaposing these studies is based not upon the similarities of the histo-
rical situation in which they are inscribed, but rather on the resemblance between the ana-
lyzed phenomena.
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economy’s informal sector, low wages, and low participation of wages in gross 
domestic product (López 1999). In their analysis of intergenerational social mobility 
in Mexican urban areas, Cortés and Escobar Latapí (2005) argue that during the 
period of economic restructuring (1988–94), there was a decline in mobility in all 
strata. Nonetheless, the effect was more evident in lower-income classes. Under the 
new economic model, inequality in terms of opportunity between the lower and the 
upper classes—professionals, bureaucrats and employers of more than fi ve workers—
grew. Thus, not only is inequality intensifi ed, but the occupational mobility system 
also becomes more rigid.
Two other countries in the region have drawn attention as a result of the 
impoverishment of their middle classes: Uruguay and Costa Rica. Inequality in 
Uruguay has traditionally been far lower than in most countries in the region as well 
as the regional average. However, Katzman (1989) warned about new poor emerging 
from former members of the middle classes. More recently, impoverishment is linked 
to the behavior of the labor market, particularly an increase in open unemployment 
rates and informal employment, as well as a relative employment decline in the public 
sector, which had helped bridge wage differences (Katzman, Filgueira et al. 2005). 
Moreover, among wage-dependent workers, the gap between heads of households 
with different levels of educational attainment grew, and individuals from households 
with at least one unemployed member began to fall further behind (Bucheli and 
Furtado 2004). Impoverishment was thus driven by the decline into poverty of lower-
middle sectors: a “short fall.” Vega Martinez’s research on Costa Rica (1999) showed 
that while the middle class remained stable from a quantitative perspective, its 
standard of living had declined. The study shows a middle class strongly tied to the 
state. The reduction of government employment, the declining quality of state 
services—leading to an increase in average household spending on private health 
and education—drove the middle classes into poverty. Thus, the author concludes 
that the decline of Costa Rica’s middle class began with the crisis of the state. Like 
its Uruguayan counterpart, the Costa Rican middle class has been affected by the 
destabilization of the mechanism that made equality possible (Montero and Bara-
hona 2003).
Brazil seems to be an exception to the rule. During the 1990s an emerging 
middle class that feels threatened by insecurity and potential impoverishment 
surfaced. Caldeira’s research (1996) describes a middle class entrenched between 
fortifi ed walls in private enclaves. Others depict more traditional segments of the 
middle class fi nding themselves threatened by changes in the economy and the labor 
market. O’Dougherty (1999) describes a middle class fearful of being forced to change 
its consumption habits; unlike its Argentinean counterpart, which blames its troubles 
on the neoliberal economic model, the Brazilian middle class believes neoliberal 
governmental reforms and economic policies will restore its consumption patterns, 
which are believed to be in jeopardy. Authors such as Valladares, Pétreceille et al. 
(2005) question the idea of “two Brazils,” one marginalized, the other formal and 
modern. Instead, they speak of a “complex Brazil” that owes much of its nature to 
the growing importance of its urban middle classes. Over the last few decades, the 
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so-called “democratization of consumption” of durable goods among low-income 
Brazilian families has increased this complexity. Mota Guedes and Vierra Oliveira 
(2006:1 ff.), describe the manner in which “low-income Brazilians began to purchase 
goods and services traditionally reserved for the middle and upper classes,” such as 
duplex refrigerators, mobile phones, automobiles, plane tickets, package deals for 
tourist travel, and credit cards. Access to these goods was facilitated by infl ation 
control, increased credit, and the falling prices of goods and technologies. Therefore, 
an “emerging middle class” is a feature of Brazil’s current development.
THE EXPERIENCE OF IMPOVERISHMENT IN ARGENTINA
The fi rst stage of impoverishment in Argentina, which occurred by the end of the 
1980s unaccompanied by job loss, created a category of “new poor” and defi ned the 
specifi c characteristics of impoverishment as a social experience different from 
unemployment or from the lifestyle of structural poverty. In addition, continuous 
waves of impoverishment have shown that pauperization is a general destabilization: 
every single aspect of family organization linked to household fi nances and seemingly 
unproblematic practices is subject to scrutiny, change, and suppression. It may entail 
removing a child from the private school his or her siblings attended, changing the 
family diet, restricting use of the family car, cutting back on trips, staying home 
instead of attending social events due to lack of appropriate attire, cancelling club 
memberships, giving up prepaid medical care, holidays, and certain social activities, 
falling dangerously behind on tax payments, discontinuing insurance payments, 
reneging on half-paid loans, and restricting dining invitations, among other measures. 
Impoverishment is lived as a transformation of daily habits, even the simplest ones, 
as the following testimony shows:
The single thing my children miss the most are [dairy-based] desserts: before, 
they could always fi nd fl an [crème caramel], they had it after dinner, it was 
a habit. Then, I began buying desserts every now and then. And when they did 
not get to have some, they would say “come on, Mom, give us dessert.” It got 
worse. So I made up my mind one day and said to myself: “Goodbye dessert, 
never again; they’d better forget about desserts and that way they won’t miss 
it anymore.” (housewife, 37, Buenos Aires)7
By affecting almost every dimension of daily life, impoverishment is a constant 
coercion toward change. It is quite a different experience from that of a stable 
situation where routines are kept and making small decisions continuously is not 
part of everyday life. It also differs from upward mobility, where change exists, but as 
7 The validity of the testimonies presented here and the theoretical inferences drawn are based 
on their integration in a wider theoretical context (Bryman 2000). Specifi cally, the results 
reviewed give the theory of new poverty additional density based on the Argentinean case. 
The examples and quotations allow to describe the experience of new poverty from the point 
of view of those affected.
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the result of a deliberate decision. Such constant coercion creates a growing 
complexity in daily life. Also, from the individuals’ point of view, it is not only a change 
in personal situation, but a disarrangement of the social world surrounding them: 
“this country is not the same anymore,” argued an interviewee. This dual perception 
of change is an obstacle to adaptation strictu senso: the adjustment to a new, already 
defi ned or defi nable context. Thus, those affected need to provide with meaning 
a particular situation to which they cannot fi nd answers, not even in the “stock of 
knowledge” of society8 or in their own family history. Indeed, neither socialization 
nor culture or even existing strategies for facing a crisis can prepare them for 
defi nitive impoverishment. The downward slide of the new poor in Argentina marked 
the end of their sense of family trajectory; whereas every generation had moved 
higher up the social ladder than the preceding one, the new poverty was a turning 
point carrying the threat of being worse-off in the future and the fear of downward 
mobility for their children. That would be one of the most recurrent signs of distress 
expressed by those suffering impoverishment and the reason for this statement by 
a semi-surprised impoverished psychologist:
I know my daughter will be worse off than we are, that’s what worries me the 
most. I, the child of blue-collar workers, attended a private school. My daughter, 
whose parents are both college graduates, must attend public schooling. 
(lawyer, woman, 52, Buenos Aires,)
A fall with no return, at least so perceived at that moment, makes pauperization 
an exceptional phenomenon in modern Argentinean history. The impoverishment of 
a signifi cant portion of the middle class meant a clear-cut break with both the 
generational and the historical-cultural models that were the rule up to that 
particular time in history, which were defi ned by expectations of upward mobility.
ADAPTATION STRATEGIES
The fi rst thing that drew the observer’s attention when visiting the homes of the 
new poor during the 1990s was an apparent dislocation of the traditional hierarchy 
of needs. In an effort to “stop the fall,” some individuals who lacked health insurance 
were still taking annual seaside vacations. Others continued to send their children to 
private schools, even though they were unable to afford health care, clothes, and 
8 The concept of “stocks of knowledge” comes from Schütz. According to him, “any interpreta-
tion of the world is based on a stock of past experiences, be they our own or those which have 
been passed down to us by our parents or teachers. These experiences, in the form of ‘avail-
able knowledge’, serve as frames of reference” (1987:12). According to Cefaï (1994:112), this 
reserve of experiences does not always provide the necessary tools to interpret a new situa-
tion. “The problem arises when an actor does not know what to say or do, cannot understand 
what is happening, cannot understand or reach agreement with others, fails to connect  a topic 
to existing relevancies […]. He is faced with the inadequacy of his ‘pre-structure of under-
standing’; his fi eld of interpretive and motivational foresight is not such that he can defi ne 
and control the situation.”
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recreational activities. It was not unusual for deeply indebted individuals to frequent 
country clubs and regularly update their wardrobes. What had happened? Had 
households been shaken to such an extent that the traditional hierarchy of needs 
had been abandoned? No: the seemingly distorted priorities of the new poor were 
a function of the alternative resources they possessed, thanks to their accumulated 
cultural and, above all, social capital.9 Unlike money, these resources were indivisible. 
Thus, belonging to a family of health professionals or having a network of friends in 
the textile industry might have provided specifi c, predetermined solutions to certain 
problems while others would remain unsolved.
If this phenomenon is compared to the relationship between poverty and 
political patronage, the latter may be described as one of the traditional mechanisms 
for the informal distribution of goods and services to the poor. Patronage is made 
possible by discretionary control over social aid in heavily populated, electorally 
signifi cant areas. Transactions of this type seem less feasible in the case of the new 
poor, who are not concentrated in specifi c geographic areas and are not the object of 
specifi c social policies. Therefore, they must negotiate for themselves if they wish to 
obtain scarce goods or additional benefi ts, or simply reduce the inconvenience of 
dealing with government institutions. In this regard, cultural capital, in its “embodied 
state,”10 offers a number of advantages when dealing with schools, hospitals or trade 
union savings associations. These advantages are clear when one compares the 
treatment of the new poor to that of the structural poor in the same institution. By 
mobilizing cultural and social capital, the former gain better access to specialists, 
hospital accommodations, and free medicine. They are more able to secure a place for 
their children at the more prestigious public schools, as well as the few existing full-
day schools (coveted by families with two working parents) and nurseries for children 
under four, which are not part of the mandatory educational system and are thus not 
required to serve the entire population. The confl icts observed by the authors of this 
article at municipal offi ces involved the distribution of benefi ts, aid, and fi nancial 
subsidies; those in the health care system arose when individuals attempted to 
obtain benefi ts not clearly established by institutional regulations.
Several of the new poor interviewed for this paper claimed to have established 
relationships with state bureaucrats that afforded them a degree of preferential 
9 Social capital “is the set of actual or potential resources tied to the possession of a durable 
network of more or less institutionalized relations of knowledge and mutual acknowledg-
ment” (Bourdieu 1980:3ff.). A more complete review can be found in Portes 1999 and Ba-
ranger 2002.
10 According to Bourdieu (1979), cultural capital exists in three forms: the embodied form, that 
is, as long-lasting dispositions of mind and body; the objective form, as cultural assets, paint-
ings, books, dictionaries, instruments, machinery; and fi nally the institutionalized form, as 
a very peculiar objectivation, for as can be seen with the school degree, it confers totally 
original properties to cultural capital rather than simply refl ecting it. This paper focuses on 
the fi rst of the three states in which cultural capital is found: the embodied state. Hence, the 
notion of disposition refers to “attitudes, inclinations to perceive, feel, do, and think, that are 
internalized by individuals based on their objective life conditions, and serve as unconscious 
principles of action, perception and refl ection” (Accardo and Corcuff 1986:229).
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treatment. Nevertheless, most of their dealings with institutions were tense. Disputes 
usually began when they started to “speak up,” since they were fi nancially unable to 
“exit” the system and engage a private service (Hirschman 1970). Clients would 
typically raise their voices to employees, strenuously reminding them of their 
obligations: how they should do their jobs (particularly in terms of customer service), 
how—and how fast—they should process information, and so forth. A new, public 
hospital client stated that “you have got to remind the employees what their duty 
is.” Complaints about staffers might expand to include the institution in general, 
with occasional references to “rights,” as well as the “respect” and “consideration” 
they were due on account of their social rank, professional status or other attributes 
that distinguished and elevated them above the general mass of people. It was not 
uncommon for users to threaten to lodge complaints and “report” employees, not 
through traditional channels (i.e., a complaint log), but rather by speaking directly 
to higher-ups whom they claimed to know personally.
Sometimes in the hospital they get you confused with a mother coming from 
a slum because they also come properly dressed. Doctors then treat you like 
a mother from the slums, until they realize that you know what they are talking 
about, that you are capable of asking good questions … then they realize who 
you are. (Housewife, 38, Buenos Aires)
Despite their efforts, uncertainty regarding means prevailed and every new 
interaction was a trial-and-error experience. No asset could be recognized as cultural 
capital until its effectiveness had been proven. It was impossible to stabilize 
resources. Attributes shown to be effective in the past (an academic degree, 
professional status, a vague reference to rights or citizenship) might be transformed 
into capital if their value was successfully demonstrated, only to lose their 
effectiveness with the next attempt (at a different institution or at the same one, 
with a different clerk or even with the same one). Users might even fi nd themselves 
rebuked with a reminder that “everybody has the same rights.”
Social capital was used by the new poor to access goods and services to which 
they were accustomed, but which they could no longer obtain through ordinary 
market exchanges. Accordingly, they sought out potential suppliers among their 
acquaintances, creating personal networks that fulfi lled some of their needs. An 
analysis of these networks shows that they were not created to exchange goods 
outside the market—unlike the classical reciprocal relationships described in studies 
of marginalized groups in Latin America (Lomnitz 1975), but rather to stretch the 
normal rules of exchange in order to obtain discounts, negotiate endless payment 
plans, and even barter certain goods, usually with professionals in the services 
sector.
Clothes-wise, I found a friend who makes me the best prices, she is a salesperson 
and sells me the cheapest things in monthly payments. If I have to pay credit, 
I borrow my brother’s credit card.
(Clerk, 48, Buenos Aires)
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The assets that are transformed into cultural or social capital when facing 
impoverishment are actually attributes built up during previous social situations, for 
other purposes; they may not even have been recognized as assets. For example, for 
professionals wanting to move forward in their careers, having a large circle of 
colleagues might constitute a valuable form of social capital. However, if the 
professional becomes impoverished and wishes to lessen the impact of his own falling 
consumption levels, this accrued capital (having colleagues) becomes less valuable. 
Access to a more diverse group of professionals would entail more potential services, 
and thus be of greater use in fulfi lling unmet needs. As one lawyer stated, ironically, 
“had I known about all the things I was going to need, instead of having so many 
lawyer friends, I would have hung out with a plumber, a construction worker, 
a hairdresser, and the owner of an apparel store.” Moreover, given the change 
experienced, the favors needed from others will be substantially different (loans 
rather than referrals, for example). There is no way of knowing whether someone who 
did favors in the past will be willing to accept new requests.
Social and cultural capital theory presupposes a stable environment, in which 
social relationships are accumulated for a specifi c purpose: upward mobility or 
surviving poverty. Impoverishment entails a change of circumstances which casts 
doubts on the effectiveness of accumulated social capital; its reconversion it not 
assured. From a conceptual perspective, the new poverty unveils the uncertain nature 
of the available resources, whose usefulness and consequent acknowledgment as 
capital will not be verifi ed until there is an actual attempt to use them. The diffi culty 
of creating stable new resources becomes greater for those impoverished during the 
crisis of 2001. The crash was so sudden, violent, and widespread that in most cases, 
there was no time to develop adaptation strategies such as the ones described above. 
Moreover, given the large number of people affected, it was impossible to develop the 
kind of networks that would have emerged during a less abrupt and massive down-
slide (Cortés and Kessler 2003).
THE EROSION OF SOCIAL IDENTITY
How do the new poor describe their place in the social structure? Does 
pauperization affect previous social classifi cations?11 The new poor interviewed for 
this research asked themselves—and the sociologists interviewing them—who they 
were now. There was no single, socially classifi able answer to this question. Unlike 
unemployment, impoverishment without job loss involves no “detachment rite” such 
as dismissal, which is both the termination of an existing status and the beginning 
of a new one (for example, the transition from general manager to unemployed 
professional). It has been observed, however, that pauperization casts doubts on 
a crucial self-classifi cation: membership of the middle class, which is closely tied to 
11 Twelve percent of respondents described themselves as lower class, while 55% described 
themselves as middle class. This shows that the middle class is still viewed as a privileged 
social category. According to offi cial statistics, poverty at the time of the survey stood 
at 43%.
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the Argentinean social identity. During the hyperinfl ationary period of 1989 and 
1990, the “end of the middle class” was a looming specter which threatened to 
annihilate an entire social stratum and the national ideal it embodied (Sigal and 
Kessler 1997). Its disappearance would turn Argentina into Brazil; that is, the 
country’s three-part balancing act would be traded for a dichotomic face-off between 
the upper and lower classes. Hyperinfl ation was a highly destructive phenomenon 
which left almost no social group untouched, turning concerns about the middle 
class into a generalized fear that the class itself was disappearing. 
Pauperization, as a long-term process, becomes visible as a social problem only 
after a while. It leads to the issue being formulated from an individual perspective, 
in terms of belonging to or being expelled from a given category. It was not posed as 
a single question, but rather as a concept group surrounding the term “middle class.” 
The initial interview question involved class membership, forcing respondents to 
defi ne the criteria they had in mind for inclusion. Was it past status, educational 
achievements, or cultural level? Next, they were asked about the scope of change: 
was it an individual matter, or did it extend to an entire social group, or to society as 
a whole? Lastly, if an individual argued that he or she had been expelled from the 
middle class, what was his or her new status?
Underlying these questions was the suppression of certain consumption habits. 
Self-inclusion in the middle class was based on real or potential access to goods and 
services beyond those required for mere survival: certain types of clothing, outings, 
vacations, appliances, vehicles, and so forth. Education may have been important, 
but consumption was the decisive factor. This was so because an individual could 
belong to the middle class without having an academic degree, and given the lifestyle 
crisis, even those with an advanced education might fi nd their class membership 
questioned. The subjects interviewed for this article fell into two categories: those 
who simply continued to claim belonging to the middle class, and those who believed 
themselves to have been expelled. The former listed assets that supposedly 
compensated for their diminished standard of living—degrees, job status, cultural 
background, habits, their past. Some spoke of a “massive devaluation of the middle 
class,” which had seen its collective standard of living decline.
Nevertheless, they did not question their own class membership or the existence 
of the middle class as a distinct social stratum. They stated it had become an “upper-
lower class.” In their view, it was more of a collective change than an individual 
expulsion, since the country’s tripartite social structure remained intact, with a third 
segment occupying the space between the upper and lower classes. The relative 
position of the middle had simply declined, bringing it closer to the lower class, as 
shown by the following testimony:
There are no labor unions or people to defend you anymore. We are back in the 
times of slavery. They pay you whatever they want and if you are not pleased, 
then you’d better drop dead. Yet those who are doing badly, very poorly, are the 
ones who were always like that. They are sunk deep in the ocean and we, who 
are now where they used to be, are trying not to continue sinking. (teacher, 51, 
Buenos Aires)
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Having defi ned the middle class in relative, hierarchical terms, we could add that 
the sense of belonging to the middle class would require access to certain types of 
consumption and avoidance of others. This explains why many interviewees rejected 
the idea that they might be legitimately entitled to benefi ts such as food stamps. 
Even families living in abject poverty believed such benefi ts were “not for them,” but 
rather for the “real poor.” Accepting social aid would stigmatize them; by rejecting 
it, they were trying to avoid being labeled. In contrast, for those who believed they 
had been expelled, lifestyle was the key component of class belonging. Self-exclusion 
was more common among those who possessed no degrees or skilled positions to 
compensate for their deteriorating standard of living when asked to defi ne their 
social identity. From positions of relative proximity, individuals adopted different 
positions, depending on whether they emphasized what had been lost or what 
remained (“I am still a professional, no matter what”). Following their (self-)declared 
expulsion from the middle class, they needed a new category to identify with. Not 
surprisingly, they refused to defi ne themselves as “poor.” The poor were a structural 
group, from which they were separated by both their past and their current lifestyle. 
Sometimes, unable to decide between the middle class and the “poor class,” they 
defi ned themselves as “working class,” thereby switching the parameters of 
classifi cation from lifestyle to source of income (wage labor). However, interviewees 
tended to be hesitant rather than decisive in their responses; social identity appeared 
to be a rather vague matter, to the extent that the interviewer—as a sociologist—
was asked where he or she would place them:
No, not middle class, anymore. There’s the poor, who where always poor, with no 
chance to get out. Maybe, God forbid, I might become poor, God forbid. The 
poor are way beyond.… I don’t know what I am, now that you ask me: I know 
I’m not part of the middle class, but, so far, I am not poor, where would you 
place me? (Housewife, 32, José León Suarez)
This situation was characteristic of the new poverty during the mid-1990s. 
Research conducted in mid-2002 showed a number of interesting changes. First of 
all, those who believed they had been expelled from the middle class were now 
a majority, and many of them described themselves as new poor (González Bombal 
2002). The term had spread beyond the boundaries of academia to those it was 
intended to describe, and they appropriated it to such an extent that, in a 2005 study 
on perceived social identity, 33% of respondents defi ned themselves as members of 
the “impoverished middle class” (Grupo CCR 2005).12 The change of social identity 
was accompanied by an easing of strategies on the part of the new poor to distance 
themselves from the “real poor.” This was refl ected mainly by a change of attitude 
regarding the welfare benefi ts they had previously refused. Hence, some of them—
a small group, given the eligibility requirements involved—enrolled in the Unemployed 
12 According to a 2007 study, 24% of Jewish welfare recipients—most of them members of the 
new poor—were enrolled in the Unemployed Heads of Household Plan or similar programs 
established by the City of Buenos Aires (Kessler 2008).
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Heads of Household Plan, a massive income-transfer program enacted following the 
2001 crisis (Kessler 2008). 13
What is the situation today regarding this social identity? Has it reconstituted 
itself among the impoverished as the economy stabilizes? Recent research describes 
the socio-cultural transformations that have taken place within the upwardly mobile 
sectors of the Argentinean middle classes since the 1990s. These changes include 
greater individualism, marked consumerism, avoidance of the lower classes and 
limited social interaction with other strata. This is most clearly exemplifi ed by the 
country’s new gated communities and real estate developments (Svampa 2004). 
Regarding consumption, goods which were once exclusive to the middle and upper 
classes have spread further down the social ladder, thanks to falling prices and easier 
access to credit. Since 2006, marketing companies abandoned access to durable 
consumer goods as a class indicator, choosing other variables instead, such as 
participation in expensive health care programs. Ownership of telephones, mobile 
phones, and traditional household appliances (refrigerators, stoves, and washing 
machines) is widespread, and can hardly be said to constitute a boundary between 
classes. Other goods, such as computers, Internet access, and vehicles, are unequally 
distributed between stable and impoverished sectors of the middle class (Mora y 
Araujo 2007). However, the new strata may soon have access to these goods, given 
their gradually declining prices. The question that remains unsolved is whether these 
impoverished sectors, which have now been partially stabilized, are recovering old 
ways of defi ning their identity through renewed access to consumption, or whether 
status indicators are changing, with class identity now depending on new consumption 
patterns and social practices rather than traditional durable consumer goods. In 
other words, it remains to be seen whether widespread ownership of goods that once 
conferred status will help to rebuild the social identity of impoverished persons, or 
whether their recent self-classifi cation as members of the new poor will be altered by 
access to consumer goods similar to those which, in the past, would have reaffi rmed 
class membership.
THE URBAN DIMENSION OF NEW POVERTY
One seldom-explored aspect of the new poverty—even though it constitutes 
a particularly relevant dimension in order to understand social phenomena—is the 
spatial distribution of the situations and its manifestations, as well as its impact on 
access to housing and urban services. The new poverty represents a breaking point 
regarding the decades-old logic of poverty in Argentina. The presence of villas miseria 
(shantytowns) in the city is a territorial manifestation of the position occupied by 
the poor in the social structure. The new poverty contradicts this logic, which is 
13 According to SIEMPRO (2001), 91% of income-poor households in the Buenos Aires Metro-
politan Area are in urban neighborhoods. Only 9% are located in shantytowns or squatter 
settlements. Nevertheless, an analysis of the composition of urban neighbourhoods shows 
that 26.8% of their households are income-poor. Among households settled in shantytowns, 
the percentage reaches 59.1%.
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characteristic of structural poverty. Social status today does not necessarily translate 
into housing and urban services. The new poverty is more diffuse and concealed than 
structural poverty; it changes the customs and practices of a city, in the city, creating 
new confl icts in urban life (Prévôt Schapira 2002).
Several decades of impoverishment, coupled with the impact of unemployment, 
have broken the mold that once confi ned the poor to clearly defi ned and identifi able 
geographic areas. Poverty during the 1990s arose in the nooks and crannies of 
cities.14 It manifested itself in the progressive deterioration and transformation of 
living spaces; a process which included gradual changes in the use and condition of 
physical structures.15 The houses of the new poor remained in middle-class 
neighborhoods; if they were lucky, the new poor retained ownership of their dwellings, 
but they were unable to make improvements or invest in maintenance. Some were 
even forced to modify their homes to make room for workshops or small stores, and to 
make an additional source of income out of them, through renting out one or more of 
their rooms. This is true for Jesús, who is now accustomed to doing that in order to 
supplement his income:
I let a room to a tenant and I have a shop, right here. I rent them […] Yes, we 
live with other people […] in the house. There was housing [available] in the 
house. For instance, there is a lady living here now, and in the other area of the 
house there was a family, a husband, a wife, two ladies and a mother-in-law, who 
lived there for a long time (Buenos Aires, doorman , 81 years old).
The deterioration and changing uses of physical structures were accompanied 
by an alteration in the logic underlying the access of the middle class to the city, 
which had traditionally been through the market. That was the social mechanism 
through which they obtained housing and urban services until their impoverishment 
seriously compromised their ability to use market mechanisms, especially since it 
was related to unemployment. In a context in which unemployment had reached vast 
sectors of the population (climbing as high as 21.5%), these mechanisms stopped 
functioning. Nelida’s account reveals the relation between changes in labor market 
insertion and the need to redefi ne the insertion in terms of habitat:
I moved in ’82 or ’83 and we came here around the time of the infl ation. We had 
a dry-cleaning store, which is not a priority, it is something you can live without, 
when you don’t have enough money, you don’t send your clothes out to dry-
clean, you manage at home. That’s how we went out of business, things got 
more expensive by the day, and people had to be more careful with the way they 
spent their money, we went out of business. Then we had to cut down on all of 
our expenses (Tigre, unemployed woman, 52 years old).
14 Increased overcrowding is one of the manifestations of poverty in formal settlements (Cate-
nazzi and Di Virgilio 2006).
15 Several middle-class households became squatters as they could not afford the rent of the 
space/residence they were living in.
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The crisis of traditional social housing access mechanisms is refl ected in 
phenomena such as squatting.16 Over the last two decades, the poor in Buenos Aires 
have taken possession of small vacant areas in the city’s downtown, such as govern-
ment buildings, buildings abandoned by their owners, factories, and warehouses, 
which they use as living quarters. These structures often lack adequate sanitation 
and electricity, and utilities such as water and power are often suspended due to lack 
of payment.
Despite the benefi ts of living in the city, the occupants of these structures live 
in squalid conditions, given their uncertain livelihoods and the poor quality of their 
housing (Herzer and Di Virgilio 1996; Rodríguez and Di Virgilio 2009).
To this we must add the withdrawal of several public services by the state, 
services that had—until the 1990s—guaranteed certain minimum living standards. 
Today, these services are very limited. Beginning in the 1990s, within the framework 
of government reforms, the internal logic underlying the reproduction of urban life 
underwent signifi cant changes. Massive privatization of services pushed the 
management of collective urban consumption into the sphere of the market, leading 
to the commoditization of basic urban services. This new model places those who 
claim services into a new scenario in which access is almost exclusively regulated by 
their capacity to earn enough income to afford a basic goods and services basket and 
which transfers the costs of living in the city directly to a worker’s wages (Catenazzi 
and Di Virgilio 2006). Facing this situation, households had to cut back on consumption 
of infrastructure services: water, gas, electricity, telecommunications, and trans-
portation.
The limitations of the state were also refl ected by the growing failure of urban 
public institutions—schools, hospitals, welfare offi ces—to address the needs of the 
poor. This is attributable to a lack of personnel and resources, as well as the elimination 
of certain services, among other factors. The new poor interviewed complained of 
having visited hospitals where doctors still perform surgeries, but with no beds, 
bandages, or medicines to be found; calling emergency services which still exist but 
have no ambulances; sending their children to schools that are still open, but fail to 
teach certain subjects, remain inactive for months, or are staffed by teachers who 
take no interest in their job; saving money to buy sophisticated alarms that ring at 
the police station when the house is robbed, only to fi nd that the police never 
respond; and going to government offi ces that are still where they have always been, 
but seem to have lost almost all of their employees.
As was mentioned before, access to property—and through it, to the city 
proper—was characteristic of the middle classes. By contrast, it was typical of 
structural poverty to be concentrated in certain areas, either villas miserias or 
informal settlements. Unlike them, the new poor keep their place of residence despite 
16 The withdrawal of several public services by the state and the state’s declining capacity to 
invest in public institutions have generally affected the lower-income population. However, 
the effect has been particularly strong for the impoverished middle sectors, which could not 
fi nd any support in those traditional mechanisms for cushioning downward social mobility 
processes.
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pauperization. This leads to the implementation of adaptation housing strategies, 
as discussed above. The dispersion of new poverty and its interstitial nature present 
an additional obstacle to the development of a social policy oriented to those sectors. 
In fact, the aid programs that resulted from the economic reform of the 1990s used 
territorial focalization criteria which would not reach the new poor. In addition, 
there were socio-cultural factors to take into account: the interviewed new poor 
self-excluded themselves from those programs, which were meant for the “real poor.” 
This situation changed with the crisis of 2001, which brought a less shameful poverty 
and non-territorially focused income-transfer projects. Thus the new poor entered 
the scope of the new social policies and became a new aided population with higher 
request capabilities.
CONCLUSION
At the end of this overview, one might ask what changes have occurred among 
the new poor, if early research is compared to more recent studies. First of all, it 
should be noted that new poverty is no longer a novel phenomenon in Argentina. The 
great wave of impoverishment that swept the country in 2001 was harsher than the 
previous crisis, and its victims were more aware of what was happening to them. 
Many have been suffering the effects of pauperization for over a decade; this has 
caused social problems, such as a rise in foreclosures due to an accumulation of debt. 
Second, many of the instances of downward mobility witnessed in the early 1990s 
appear to have been episodes in unstable trajectories. A study of occupational 
mobility in Argentina (Kessler and Espinoza 2007) shows that some of those who 
became impoverished in the early 1990s saw their situation improve during later 
periods of growth, only to deteriorate afterwards. The trajectories and experiences 
of these individuals are not akin to a fall without recovery. Compared to those who 
became impoverished in the crisis of 2001, newer evidence shows that among the 
unemployed, the younger and the educated have had more opportunities to re-enter 
the labor market.
Moreover, the 1990s also witnessed structural upward mobility, that is, an 
increase in both absolute and relative terms in the number of jobs associated with 
the middle class because of the skills they require (Torrado 1994). The benefi ts and 
well-being offered by these jobs declined, however, due to falling income and a gene-
ral increase in job precarity. Consequently, many individuals experienced upward 
inter- or intra-generational mobility in terms of the skill classifi cation of their jobs, 
but their well-being remained unchanged, or even declined. This phenomenon has 
been described as “spurious mobility” (Kessler and Espinoza 2007).
Thirdly, the new poverty of the early 1990s was a domestic matter, which did not 
generate collective actions or strategies outside households. By 2000, as shown by 
Luzzi (2005) in her study on the Barter Club—a system for the exchange of goods 
and services that grew to include two million people in 2001—the middle class had 
come out into the open and devised collective strategies. One instance of massive 
departure from traditional middle-class organization that included the new poor was 
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the creation of neighborhood assemblies in Buenos Aires, parts of the surrounding 
metropolitan area, and cities in the rest of the country, in the wake of the 2001 crisis. 
These new experiences made the middle class an important political player, especially 
in Buenos Aires, albeit for a short period.
One resounding conclusion that may be drawn from this study is that the new 
poverty poses signifi cant questions for public policy in different countries. These are 
questions which—at least in Argentina, where impoverishment has been a reality for 
over a decade—have not been met with innovative policies. Such policies would 
have to include territorial components, since cities, and access to them, have been 
strongly affected by impoverishment. There can be no doubt that, in this new context, 
tremendous creativity will be required; traditional approaches, such as those which 
focus on geographic areas inhabited by large numbers of poor people, are ineffective 
when dealing with a population scattered throughout a city. For those who have been 
following the phenomenon for years, including the authors of this paper, it is 
disconcerting to fi nd that, even though the issue is on the national agenda and 
occupies a place in the public mind, no policies have been developed for this popu-
lation. While the existence and growth of “hard” poverty (which public policy has 
also failed to properly address) is certainly an issue, our research from a decade ago 
had already shown that the remarkable impoverishment of the country’s households 
was largely due to a lack of preventive policies. While this may not have been the 
initial cause of impoverishment, there can be no question that a number of measures—
none of them particularly costly—would have helped impoverished households 
cushion the impact of the crisis and, above all, avoid the accumulation of needs that 
peaked later on.
As mentioned in the introduction to this article, the Argentine experience may 
be viewed as a model of similar processes taking place elsewhere in the world. The 
mistakes made in Argentina—by action or by omission—should serve as a warning 
to other countries to avoid suffering for vast sectors of the population.
Finally, we consider it proper to raise some (self-)criticisms of those of us who 
studied poverty issues in the 1990s. The novelty of what was happening with the 
socio-professional middle categories caught our attention so strongly that we failed 
to see beyond it and to analyze the impact of impoverishment upon the social 
structure as a whole. Concretely, the impoverishment of the middle sectors and their 
displacement from certain jobs at the peak of unemployment, displaced the old poor 
to unskilled jobs; other jobs, as a result of modernization, changed classifi cation and 
thus could not continue to be occupied by unskilled poor people. There was a situation 
of competitiveness within the labor market in which the structural poor lost eligibility 
and jobs that were traditionally occupied by the lower sectors are now the prerogative 
of the impoverished, yet better-qualifi ed, middle sectors. Moreover, the strategy 
previously used by poor households—that is, supplementing the income of the head 
of the household, or even replacing it in times of unemployment, with a female 
member working in housekeeping—was also affected by the impoverishment of the 
middle class (Porcú 2003). Hence, it is pertinent to continue asking questions about 
what was happening to structural poverty in that particular context.
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